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THE REVOLUTIONARY CHURCH? 
THE ROLE OF EAST GERMAN PROTESTANTS AMID POLITICAL CHANGE 
By Todd W. Harris 
Todd W. Harris (United Methodist) received the B.A. degree in religion from 
Birmingham-Southern College. He studied a year and half at University of Tiibingen 
at the time when the Berlin Wall fell. He intends to continue his studies at Frankfurt 
University as a Rotary International fellow. 
Methodological Issues 
This study was begun during the months of March and April of 1990 during the course 
of travel through Eastern Europe. Working under the support of the Highlands United 
Methodist Educational Foundation of Birmingham, Alabama and the Dixon Foundation, f 
visited four countries--The c;Jerman Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland. Subsequent research and writing was then conducted at the University 
of Tubingen, West Germany. 
The method of investigation was straightforward. I began my study in East Berlin· with 
visits to the offices of the Okumenischer Jugenddienst1 and the administrative headquarters 
of the Berlin-Brandenburg district of the Bund der evange/ischen K_irchen in der DDR.2 
With the few names and contacts that I found there, I began making interviews. I asked 
repeatedly for suggestions from each person I interviewed, and to my good fortune, most of 
them graciously provided me with further contacts. Thus, I found myself with a steady flow 
of appointments. Furthermore, this method of "following the lead" took me throughout East 
Germany, both to larger cities and. into the country. I was also able to accumulate a small 
list of names and addresses which gave me direction when I headed to the other countries on 
my tour. 
1Translated "Ecumenical Youth Services," an organization UQder the direction of the 
Protestant Church Administration. 
2Translated "Alliance of Evangelical (Protestant/Lutheran) Churches in the GDR." 
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Because I found it important to also hear some opinions of persons who were not related 
to the church, among those interviewed were political leaders, university students, and 
members of citizens' and activists' groups. Primarily, however, interviews were conducted 
with people within the churches. Though the majority were pastors, whenever possible I 
spoke with members of congregations, church administrative officials, seminarians, or those 
who otherwise participate in the church. Thus, I attempted to interview people who might 
provide perspectives from widely varying backgrounds and experiences. 
·The content of the interviews was equally as straightforward. I made it clear that I was 
not in search of any particular information, that I was instead interested in hearing the 
personal perspectives of each interviewee. I asked general and open-ended questions, usualiy 
following these three lines: 
I. What kind of role(s) did the churches play, both over the past years and more recently, 
in the political changes in the GDR? 
2. Is the. situation now, since the "peaceful revolution" of Fall, 1 989, in any real sense 
different for the church? Have things changed for the church? If so, how? 
3. What kind of role(s) will the church have in the future? What issues will be important 
or determining? 
As a rule, I allowed the conversations to follow where the interviewees led. Rather than 
steering the discussions through a preplanned series of questions, I purposely asked broad 
questions in order to give my dialogue partner the chance to speak about those issues which 
were important to him or her. Once again, in this manner, I felt I would more likely hear 
a wide range of perspectives. 
Thus, this study can make no claims to systematic accuracy with regards to its correctness 
in representing "the church." It would be impossible to make a claim which adequately 
represented the opinion and experience of all christians in East Germany. Naturally, there 
will be those whose experience contradicts some material presented here. For example, I met 
a young man in Dresden who was absolutely convinced that the churches had done nothing 
more than plead for nonviolence during the course of the fall demonstrations. As far as he 
was concerned, however, the church had played no other significant role. Whether his 
standpoint was merely a reflection of ignorance of the situation, or whether he had simply 
judged all other church actions as insignificant, is here beside the point. More important is 
the fact that from the varying perspectives of others interviewed, the church had indeed 
played other roles in the political changes. Therefore, this paper will not attempt to make 
statements which are supposedly valid for the single entity "church," because I) admittedly 
the method employed in research was of an unsystematic nature, and 2) had the method 
indeed been more systematic, it would still hold true that any such statement might be 
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disputed by the experience of another.3 Instead, this paper must be viewed as a systematic 
attempt to reflect upon that information and those perspectives which I did in fact receive 
through the interviews, an effort to understand and comment upon the perspectives which 
were available from the research. Only then, in light of systematic reflection upon past and 
present perspectives within the church, can and will attempts be made to discuss issues which 
will effect the church--as a whole--in the future. (Projected political roles of East German 
protestants in the future will be discussed in another article currently being researched.) Here 
again, these attempts are not intended to represent the opinion of all East German Christians 
and every East German church without exception; instead they represent my own response 
and commentary to the collection of thought and experience which the study provided� 
Therefore, the nature of the material which is here presented must be made clear, in 
order that general biases may be taken into account. The most striking of these biases .is the 
fact that none of those interviewed in East Germany were members of the Catholic Church. 
Thus, when speaking of perspectives which I witnessed in the church, I am referring to the 
perspectives which I heard from Protestants. That is not to say, however, that the 
presentation and discussion of those perspectives have no claim to validity with regard to the 
Catholic Church. Where the discussion concerns only matters of fact, or where commentary 
is being made regarding issues that will confront the church in the future, the statements 
made should be considered valid for the Catholic Church as well as the Protestant. For 
instance, anyone--be she or he Catholic or Protestant--may tell me of the Catholic Church's 
participation in the ecumenical assemblies of 1988 and 1989." Obviously, for information 
of that sort, one need not be Catholic, and such "empirical" data will not be colored by virtue 
of the interviewee's faith. 
Such a bias in the interviews does leave one unignorable shortcoming, however. 
Although those perspectives provided by Protestants in the interviews may allow statements 
to be made about the Catholic Church as well, there are undoubtedly many other perspectives 
•Nhich Catholics might have provided, which upon systematic reflection would have in turn 
allowed commentary to be made concerning protestants as well. There will always be other 
3This is another way of saying that it is impossible to confine "church" to a single, static 
definition. There is simply too much variation among those who collectively make up "the 
church." Thus, even in the later discussion of future perspectives for "the church," for 
purposes of this discussion one must understand the term as the aggregate of the individual 
congregations, as "all the christian congregations," or "all of the churches." 
4The ecumenical assemblies are discussed in section 5: "The Conciliary Process." 
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perspectives which remain unheard, both of Protestants and Catholics, and also those of the 
much smaller, through quite alive "free churches."5 
Further, it should be acknowledged that this analysis of the role of East German 
Christians in recent pol.itical changes has been conducted after similar studies among the 
churches in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Whereas much of the commentary 
regarding future issues would also be relevant to a discussion of those countries, much would 
not. Exactly because of my exposure to these other churches, their histories, their opinions 
and outlooks, I have been better able to examine the East German situation and to comment 
on issues which I identify to be specifically applicable to Germany. 
Finally, this commentary is written from the standpoint of an outsider looking in. This 
paper seeks to be a presentation of perspectives which are either foreign or unknown to most 
American readers. Thus, on one hand.this paper serves as an informative report. But this 
paper is also an introductory attempt to understand those differences in thought and action 
which will become apparent from the details of the church's roles before and during this 
period of political upheaval. On the whole, the East German churches understand themselves 
in a distinctive manner. This paper is therefore, on the other hand, an introductory attempt 
to understand this self-understanding among East German Christians. Thus, after outlining 
some of the most important roles which the Protestant Church has played, my ongoing 
research and writing is attempting to discuss this German self-understanding as they 
themselves have expl�ined it to me. Of course, any analysis or discussion of pertinent issues 
for the future must only be made in the light of this understanding. These matters will be 
addressed in future articles. 
The Active Role of the Churches 
Over the past several years, the churches in East Germany have played many political 
roles, and they have actively participated in the efforts to bring about change in their 
country. Whether serving as host for the activity of opposition groups, explicitly campaigning 
against party policy, or preaching politically oriented messages within their own services, the 
churches have been involved in the political processes within the GDR. This section will 
outline some of those roles. 
[1] A Roof Over the Opposition's Head 
Perhaps the most obvious and easily observable role of the churches in the past years has 
been as an open forum for opposition groups. Only in the church was one allowed to speak 
5"Free churches" (Freikirchen) is a term used by Germans to designate most 
denominational churches, e.g. Baptists, Methodists, charismatic denominations, etc. 
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openly against the government. For that reason, from the early 1980s, the church 
increasingly became the meeting place for opposition groups of all sorts, both Christian and 
non-Christian. Whether inside the church or not, though, any and all words critical of the 
system were viewed by the SED6 as staatsfeindlich--as hostile to the state. Church members 
report that it was therefore not uncommon for Stasi1 members, the secret police, to attend 
or observe church functions or meetings. Although unaware of their identity, church 
members were certain that Stasi agents were present. Once at home after meetings, many 
reported receiving threatening phone calls concerning their participation in church affairs, 
and some received photographs in the mail, portraying themselves entering church buildings, 
as a reminder that the Stasi were watching. But apparently the state was unwilling to take 
any further steps to stop such activity in the church. As one Berlin pastor told me, "That's 
all they did. They would watch us with their spies." And so the church remained a place 
where one could freely voice his or her opinion, where one could be critical. Thus, the 
church served as the home of the opposition. 
The church's involvement in this respect did not arise from pious, religious grounds. It 
was a simple, practical matter. Without the churches as a roof over the heads of the 
opposition, there would have been little if any opportunity for one to speak freely. There 
would have literally been no room for discussion, at least no place where the state would not 
have interfered. This must not be understood to say that the churches were forced into this 
role or that they did not freely offer their facilities. But more importantly, one must 
recognize the fact that the ch'urch's involvement as "foster home" was a practical necessity, 
if the opposition movement was to survive. Therefore, the statement of one congregation 
member becomes understandable: "This was no pious revolution." 
It also is understandable, then, that at times there arose conflict within many 
congregations concerning their involvement with non-Christian, politically-oriented 
opposition groups. Since their contact to these groups was understood neither as an 
opportunity for evangelism nor as an interest on the part of the outsiders to become a part 
of the church, some church members saw no reason why the church should open its doors to 
them. However, the fact that so many of the churches did allow such groups the use of their 
facilities is proof that the majority of church members, or at least the more influential 
church leadership, supported this involvement. 
6The letters in German stand for "Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands," which 
translated means the "Socialist Unity Party of Germany." 
7"Stasi" is an abbreviation and nickname for the Staatssicherheit -- the state security . 
(secret police) 
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Some congregations, however, did shut their doors to opposition groups out of fear that 
meetings might someday escalate into violent demonstrations or open confrontation with the 
state. This sentiment was understandably to be found primarily among larger, better known 
churches. Political activity within smaller churches was not as threatening to the state 
because it was not necessarily of a highly public character. Accordingly, it elicited less 
government attention, and escalation was therefore less of a risk. Large or well-known 
congregations had to take. such risks into consideration. "We had to be careful as to what we 
supported," remarked one East Berlin pastor, explaining that because of the central location 
and high visibility of his church, he and his congregation had always feared that holding 
politically oriented meetings might provoke retaliation from the state. They had therefore 
refrained from involvement with opposition groups. Yet, even this congregation and 
apparently most others became willing to take that risk by the late 1 980's. In the past couple 
of years, political discussion was therefore much more the rule than the exception. 
[2) The Explicitly Political Activity of the Churches Over the Years 
Aside from supporting the political discussion and activities of non-church opposition 
groups, the church itself played many active roles of a political nature. This has been the 
case throughout the history of the GDR. It would undoubtedly be impossible to discuss or 
even to know all of the services that the churches performed in each of their respective 
parishes. Here, I will briefly discuss three specific political functions of the churches which 
were more national in scope. 
As of January, 1 962, all young men in the GDR were required to spend eighteen months 
in the army. This was considered by the administration to be civil duty and fulfillment of 
obligation to the state. Objections of conscience against carrying weapons by no means 
freed one from this obligation. Almost immediately after the law's introduction, strongly 
opposing sentiment arose among political pacifists and within the churches. By 1964, under 
continued pressure from the church, the party amended the requirement. Those who 
declined armed military service "for religious or similar reasons" were from that point 
allowed to fulfill their obligation as Bausoldaten, soldiers who participated in building 
projects. Even this unarmed alternative, however, often involved work on weapons plants 
or missile installations. Thus, there continued to be protest against the required service. 
After further pressure from the church in the late 60's, more and more objecting Bausoldaten 
were reassigned to building projects which were not of a strictly military nature. 
The government did little to inform young men about this branch of the service. 
Government publications about required military service often made no mention of this 
alternative. The church therefore made efforts to inform the population through its own 
publications, though government censorship often stopped these efforts from being effective. 
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Still, the church was the primary SOUI'ee of i'formation and support Cor the Bausoldaten. 
Although oh"rches were effectively unable to "go to the people" with their publications in 
order to make young men aware of their options, many young men came to them. Many who 
had previously had no contact to the church joined its ranks so that they could then legally 
choose unarmed military duty.8 The result was that over the years more and more young 
men chose the Bausoldat option. 9 
Just as the churches became the main source of publicity for this alternative within the 
military, they often played similar roles of providing information to the general public. For 
instance, it was the churches who made data available concerning the worsening 
environmental situation in the GDR. Because the government refused to release statistics 
concerning the environment, numerous citizens' groups formed to research and collect data 
themselves. However, these groups were not able to publish their findings. Such publication 
would have been viewed as antagonistic by the state, and their activities would have been 
ended altogether. Many churches therefore supported these groups by displaying the 
environmental data inside the church buildings. The government was unwilling to stop the 
churches from publicizing such material, apparently because the data were to be found inside 
the church. The church found itself in the perfect position to play this role, and thus it often 
became the source of politically related or activist information for the East Germans. 
The churches also took the responsibility of working to insure that elections, although not 
wholly democratic, were conducted without deceit. Acting as poll-watchers during elections 
and participating in the couniing of votes afterwards, representatives of the church acted as 
a check for the government-run proceedings. After much voting fraud in the May, 1 989 
elections, it was the church who was able to show the public the actual extent of government 
manipulation. To understand this work of the church, though, one should first know 
something of the past election procedures in East Germany. 
Before the Fall revolution, GDR government was run solely by the Communist Party. 
Although candidates had to be elected by the people, only the party nominated the 
candidates. When an East German citizen was handed a ballot at a voting location, he needed 
only to drop it into the ballot box--without making any mark whatsoever--in order for it 
to count as a "Yes" vote for the entire list of party-nominated candidates. According to the 
experience of several interviewees from different locations, if one wished to vote against 
the party choices, he had to strike through each and every name individually. · Even if only 
SStefan Berg, "Ende der Bausoldaten. Zukunftig gibt es einen Zivildienst." Kirche im 
Sozialismus. (February, 1990), pp. 28ff. 
90fficial statistics were neve·r made available until 1987, when it was estimated that 
approximately 1 200 young men per year were becoming Bausoldaten. 
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one name was left without being crossed out, the entire ballot--and with it every name - ­
was registered as a "yes." Of course, it  would seem that dissatisfied citizens could have easily 
voted against the party candidates by taking the time to cross through each of their names. 
But there was considerable pressure not to do this. Because the earlier common practice had 
been to simply drop one's unmarked ballot into the box, anyone who actually stepped into 
a voting booth was making public his dissenting vote. And the Stasi were most certainly 
taking names. Under fear of the consequences, relatively few used the booths. After voting 
hours ended, votes were counted publicly; citizens were allowed to be present as tallies were 
made. The state, therefore, appeared to have every claim to legitimacy because no one had 
been "forced" to vote for party candidates, and citizens had themselves verified that votes 
were counted correctly. 
In the past several years, more and more citizens began to use the voting booths. Church 
congregations organized themselves to insure that members were present at every voting 
location. These members encouraged voters to exercise their right to use the voting booths. 
After polls were closed, church members participated in the counting and recording of tallies. 
The government was actually_ happy to have the church representatives present. For as long 
as the churches certified the results, the government had even more reason to claim 
legitimacy. 
In May, · 1 989, however, it was exactly the church who destroyed the government's 
credibility. Popular unrest was rising, and many more citizens were willing to voice their 
dissatisfaction with their votes. At the May 7th elections, church members were once again 
present to insure fair play. On the next day, state-controlled newspapers published only 
overall vote totals for larger metro areas without providing totals from each local poll. The 
results claimed commanding support for the government. Church members, in disbelief of 
the high percentage of supporting votes, began collecting counts from other local churches 
who had been present at other loqal polls. Their totals proved that the government reports 
were false10. 
The government fraud came as the last straw for many East German citizens. It was 
shortly thereafter, when Hungary opened its borders, that disillusioned thousands began to 
flee the country. The discovered voting manipulation served as perhaps the greatest catalyst 
in bringing about the revolution at that time. Had the churches not acted as a guard against 
this deception, party candidates would have held their claims to legitimacy. It is probably 
impossible to speculate as to how the story might have unfolded from there. 
10 According to church members whom I interviewed, the SED candidates had, in fact, 
received sufficient votes to be elected, but the published results were wholly exaggerated. 
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(3) The InsurQace of Nonviolence 
The most evident role played by the church during the political revolution of 1 989 and 
1 990, and perhaps the most important role, was its concerted effort to deter violent uprising 
among the people and to prevent violent reaction against the people by the state. It would 
not be unfair to cite the church as the primary reason why many have been able to refer to 
the events of this period as the "Peaceful Revolution." The church was not only present at 
the most volatile moments when violent confrontations were most likely, that is, at the 
mammoth demonstrations11 but was usually the leader and organizer of the demonstrations. 
As such, the church had the ability to determine the peaceful tone of what otherwise might 
only have been ineffective riots. 
The revolutionary mood of the East German people reached explosive proportions during 
the Summer of 1989. Unrest over exposed election fraud continued to anger the population. 
Hungary had opened its borders, and thousands had left their homes to flee the GDR. 
Western embassies were filled with East Germans wishing to leave. Demonstrations began 
to grow. 
The point which must be understood about the protests is that they grew out of church­
sponsored events. Since the early 1980s, groups had been gathering weekly on Monday 
evenings to pray for peace. This began in four major churches in Leipzig, but soon others. 
followed suit in Dresden and East Berlin. In the early years, members of these groups report 
that only thirty to forty attended. Prayers concentrated on rights for citizens, such as the 
ability to travel freely outside the East Block. But in the late SO's, as it became apparent that 
the SED government was not going to follow the lead of the Soviet Union to implement 
Perestroika-like restructuring of the Communist system in the GDR, the emphasis of the 
prayers changed with the tide of dissatisfaction among the people. The Monday meetings 
became known as the "peace prayers," and attendance grew. By the Summer of 1 989, . 
thousands were crowding churches all across the country every Monday evening from 5:00 
to 6:00 p.m. After the prayers, instead of the usual politically-oriented discussions which 
had followed the prayer time for several years, the crowds filed from the churches into the 
streets, where demonstrations were staged. These were the battles tha� were fought in �ast 
Germany's revolution; the battlefields were the. city streets. 
Not all churches were in support of the demonstrations, however, citing their fears of 
being associated with something which might escalate into violence. But as one pastor told 
me, when he witnessed a brutal police crackdown on demonstrators in central East Berlin's 
Alexander Square, he realized that "this system didn't have a future." His church, an historic 
11The largest demonstrations reportedly exceeded 300,000 protestors in Leipzig, more 
than 1 ,000,000 in East Berlin. 
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landmark located right in the middle of the square, which out of fear had previously not 
opened its doors for large peace prayers or supported the demonstrations, now became a 
leader. Only four weeks later, on November 4, it is estimated that one million East Berliners 
demonstrated on that very square around the church. It was this pastor, Joachim Koppehl, 
who led the processional which marched around the several-mile-long perimeter. Behind 
him was drawn a wagon which carried an instrumental band, playing "When the Saints Go 
Marching In." Pastor Koppehl reported that the event had an air of victory about it. It was 
but five days later that the SED government announced the opening of the Berlin Wall. 
The state authorities were evidently aware of the church's leadership role in the 
demonstrations, as suggested by its attempts to undermine the church's credibility by 
discrediting church leadership: Leipziger Stadtfunk, the state�run radio, asked Pastor 
Gottfried Schleinitz if he would be interested in recording a statement which would be 
broadcast to the public in the event that peaceful demonstrations evolved into violent 
confrontations between citizens and police. Pastor Schleinitz is a rather well-known minister 
in Leipzig, who at the time was involved in organizing and facilitating the meetings of 
underground opposition groups. It was reasonable to assume that a recording of a statement 
by him might influence some of the public. If riots broke out or a bloody crackdown 
occurred, a request from Schleinitz might convince some to quit their violence. On the single 
condition that any such recording be broadcast only in the case of a violent escalation, Pastor 
Schleinitz agreed. He recorded the following statement, calling for peaceful demonstration: 
My document is the Bible. There I read, "Seek the city's best." A few of you, 
perhaps a couple hundred of those who are now underway in the streets, know me. 
To you I can speak personally. Before you go farther, even one more step, think 
whether or not that which is supposed to happen now on the street is really the city's 
best. I read in the Bible, "Seek peace and hunt after it." After what are we hunting? 
Are we hunting peace? Or what are we hunting? The prophet Jeremiah and the 
apostle Paul, who formulated those sentences thousands of years ago, were exactly as 
powerless as I am at this moment. For me remains only the urgent request: No · 
violence of any sort! But really, no violence of any sort! The unarmed hope is what 
remains for us.12 
· 
On the evening of October 1 6th, even as Gottfried himself was on Karl-Marx Square, 
participating in a very peaceful demonstration, State Radio broke its promise and broadcast 
the statement which was heard by all, including Gottfried Schleinitz, over loudspeakers 
before the crowd of an estimated 1 20,000. On that day, however, the demonstration was 
proceeding very calmly. Thus, the statement was not only unnecessary, but it also appeared 
12I had the good fortune to find a cassette recording of the broadcast, which enables me 
to bear witness to the impassioned and emotional tone of the statement, which the reader 
might not perceive from the text alone. · The text appears here as a translation of the original, 
which can be found in: Jetzt oder nie--Demokratie: Leipziger Herbst '89. (Leipzig: C. 
Bertelsmann, 1 990), pp. 1 1 7 - 1 1 8. 
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as though Schleinitz was sympathetic to the SED government, which was naturally interested 
in maintaining order. Pastor Schleinitz tost much of his credibility, and he had been used 
by the Leipziger Stadtfunk in an attempt to protect the government from potential violence. 
When on the following day Schleinitz delivered a letter to the Leipziger Volkszeitung,18 
explaining what had happened, the newspaper refused to print it, demonstrating once again 
state resolve to disgrace one of the leaders of the demonstration movement. Only after 
Schleinitz had taken the letter to the Bishop, who in turn distributed it among the city's 
churches, who then in their turn read the explanation before beginning the peace prayers the 
following Monday, did Schleinitz regain his credibility. Ironically, the Leipziger 
Volkszeitung printed the text in its next edition, claiming that it had intended all along to 
publish the statement. Backed against the wall by the public readings of his letter, it was the 
radio, not Schleinitz, who suffered a loss of credibility. 
Although such attempts were apparently not uncommon, 14 it was clear that the state and 
its functionary organs were unwilling to publicly confront the church. Dr. Peter 
Zimmermann, then Professor of Theology at Leipzig's Karl Marx University, recounted for 
me his experience on November 1 1 ,  1989, when police cracked down--in some instances 
brutally--on peaceful demonstrators. Because the demonstration had followed the peace 
prayers at the Nikolaikirche, it seemed likely that police would have been interested in 
arresting those who had spurred on the protest: the pastors. Zimmerman's witness, however, 
clearly shows otherwise. He testified, 
No, the clergy weren't arrested. As a matter of fact, I watched as two policemen 
tried to take one pastor in, and an officer yelled from the side, · "Not him, he's a 
pastor!" So from the very beginning, there was an attempt to avoid this 
confrontation. 
That there was conflict within the party as to how to deal with the church is suggested by 
another of Zimmerman's accounts. It has been shown that the state attempted in some cases 
to remove the church from its leadership role (e.g. Gottfried Schleinitz) but that the state was 
reluctant to defy the church publicly (Zimmerman's account of pastors' exemption from the 
crack-down). These reports in themselves point to an uncertainty within the party as to 
policy concerning the church. This suggestion is confirmed by limited incidents of 
cooperation on behalf of party members with church leaders and with church endeavors. 
The best example is Dr. Zimmerman's experience: On Monday, October 2, 1989, for the 
first time riot police, wearing helmets and carrying clubs and shields, broke up the Leipzig 
13Translated Leipzig People's News. 
14For instance, I spoke with one pastor in Dresden who reporteq receiving numerous 
threatening phone calls which demanded he cease his involvement with opposition groups. 
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demonstration. Similar events took place on Wednesday and Thursday in Dresden. On 
Friday, October 6, the fortieth anniversary of the GDR, while Erich Honecker entertained 
special guest Mikhail Gorbachov with an impressive military parade in East Berlin, police 
forces brutally engaged approximately 10,000 demonstratorsY On October 7, the Leipziger 
Volkszeitung printed a statement from a military commander, claiming that his troops were 
prepared, weapons in hand, to once and for all crush the counterrevolutionaries, if need be. 
Dr. Zimmerman said, "One knew that if it stood in the newspaper, then it wasn't the opinion 
of one man for his 1 00 troops, but rather the opinion of the party and the state." Later that 
day, in Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig, the threat was carried out with fire hoses, and many 
arrests were made. Everyone knew that "on Monday shots would probably be fired." 
Over the weekend Dr. Zimmerman worked frantically to prevent a bloody confrontation 
between protestors and security forces. He assembled a group of six men, including himself, 
for the purpose of writing a statement to the public. Zimmerman explained that 
what was needed in Leipzig was a group of people who were so well known, or who 
were so representative for the groups involved, that everyone would listen, so that the 
preacher in the pulpit and the riot policeman and the Stasi and every woman on the 
street would have at least one or two names which they could associate with political 
or moral influence. 
The "Leipzig Six," as they became nicknamed, consisted of Zimmerman, who represented the 
church, Leipzig's most prominent citizen--orchestra master Kurt Masur, a well-known artist, 
and three local officials of the SED. After meeting and writing the brief statement, 
Zimmerman delivered copies to each of the area churches, to be read at the peace prayers 
on Monday before the demonstrations began, and Kurt Masur recorded the statement for 
Leipziger Rundfwzk. When Monday came, as tensions were high, the churches delivered the 
message, and Masur's recorded voice was played repeatedly over the radio throughout the 
evening. The message was as follows: 
Our common concern and responsibility have brought us -together today. We are 
moved by the development in our city and seek a solution. We all need the free 
exchange of opinion about the further course of socialism in our country. Therefore, 
those named above today promise to all citizens, that they shall exercise all of their 
power and authority, to see that this dialogue is carried on, not only within the 
district of Leipzig, but also with our administration. We urgently request your 
prudence, in order that peaceful dialogue will become possible. 
This was an important statement. It was received by the masses as a sign of hope. To 
them it meant, "Yes, we will continue to demand change. Yes, we will continue to 
demonstrate. We will find dialogue." But peacefully. Despite its brevity and lack of weighty 
15Gorbachov's comment to Western reporters while on his visit to Berlin was not reported 
in any of the East German newspapers. It sounds a bit ironic today, in light of Mr. 
Gorbachov's own political fate: "Life punishes those who come too late" (recorded as "Wer 
zu spiit kommt, den bestraft das Leben"). 
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rhetoric, this small statement was to become one which will live in history books into 
posterity. Did it work? Zimmerman remarked that after the regular· protest march, when 
all had proceeded smoothly, even though police and troops had been present, "We knew then 
that on this Monday we had won." 
I recount this story primarily for three reasons. First, the text is of historic significance, 
being credited by many as the principal reason that a massacre never occurred at the height 
of tensions in Leipzig. Secondly. this text is of particular relevance to this study because it 
was, at least in great part, the result of efforts of the church, both in its distribution and 
publication and its authorship by one of the best-known representatives of the church in 
Leipzig, Dr. Peter Zimmerman.16 Thirdly, the brief statement would most likely never have 
effected such an impact had not district SED officials comprised three of the "Leipzig Six." 
To be sure, their participation played some role in securing the help of state-run radio. This 
represents a rare instance of cooperation by party members with the church, or at minimum 
with the church's cause, since the short document was perceived as having been initiated by 
church leadership. This statement appears to have been a meaningful aid to preventing 
violence in Leipzig. By extension, due to its central role, the church may likewise be 
designated a meaningful assistance. 
Thus, we have seen that the church acted as a major force in the maintenance of peace 
throughout the "Peaceful Revolution." Since the early 1980s, the churches had focused their 
attention on issues of peace, as evidenced by the weekly gatherings to pray for peace. 
Church pastors led the protesting public through the streets, demanding political change. 
Those who stood for the church enlisted even party functionaries in the cause of nonviolence. 
Church leadership spoke most loudly, most clearly, as the voice of peace. 
[4) The Sermons 
At this point, I will turn attention away from the public activities of the church -- away 
from its battle over required military service, its duties as poll-watcher, its role as guarantor 
of nonviolence during mass protests, etc.--and will focus briefly upon the life within the 
church itself. Was the church, in its internal routines, equally as concerned with politics as 
its public activities might suggest? The central act of the Christian community is its common 
worship. Thus, looking at some of the sermons which have been preserved from the period 
around the revolution reveals for us what was on the minds of congregations. Even at a 
glance, one becomes aware that the politically turbulent environment, in which the church 
16Dr. Zimmerman had also been instrumental in organizing the peace prayers at Leipzig's 
Nikolaikirche since the early 1 980's. He reports having been a participant when people at the 
gatherings had numbered as few as twelve. 
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found itself, served as a rich source from which sermon topics were drawn. Politics, or at 
least politically active Christianity, was being preached from the pulpit. 
Before 1 989 had drawn to a close, one book had been published containing sermons from 
mid-August to November. It demonstrates that pastors across the country were attempting 
to apply the gospel in a politically pregnant context. The very title of the book makes a 
political statement: Riiumt die Steine Hinweg17 (Clear the Stones Away!). It is a quote from 
the 62nd chapter of Isaiah, a call to clear a path for the returning people of Judah, whom 
God is rescuing from exile in Babylonia. The preface to the collection contains the words 
Go through, go through the gates, 
prepare the way for the people; 
build up, build up the highway, 
clear it of stones, 
lift up an ensign over the peoples. (Isaiah 62: 10, RSV) 
Here it is clear, however, that the people awaiting imminent rescue by God are not the 
Hebrews, but the East Germans, who have been "exiled" into a failed socialism. The preface 
to the book, like so many of the sermons which it contains, reads like living prophecy, a 
prophecy which, as we are now aware, was in a certain sense to come true, since the East 
German people did in fact return to a reunited German state. 
All of the sermons in that one volume are politically oriented. Here, however, as an 
example, I will discuss only one: Bernd Albani, pastor of the Gethsemane Church in East 
Berlin, led a vigil on October 5, 1989 in remembrance of those who had been unjustly 
imprisoned. In his meditation, Pastor Albani lamented the recent story of thousands of 
young Germans who, having lost hope in their own land, had crowded into Western embassies 
until, after weeks Or suspense, they were finally allowed to board trains bound for new 
homes, beyond the confines of the East Block. In frustration he exclaimed, "What's going on 
in this country, that makes its borders ever thicker .. . ? What am I supposed to do with my 
sadness, my shame, my anger?" Reminding those assembled of the previous day's events, in 
which many who had not been allowed to board the West-bound trains had chosen to vent 
their frustration with violence, he quoted the words of Paul, saying, "For freedom Christ has 
set us free. Stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery" (Gal 5: I, 
RSV). 
Paul had been concerned with freedom from rituals, rituals that had been forced upon 
others. "We, too, know such rituals," said Pastor Albani, "Rituals of a new religion, of an 
ideology, that sets itself as absolute." And· then he listed the rites of socialism: 
17Ebert, Andreas, Johanna Haberer and Friedrich Kraft, eds. Riiumt die Steitze hinweg. 
DDR Herbst 1989. Geistliche Reden im politischen Aufbruch. (Ingolstadt, Federal Republic 
of Germany: Claudius Verlag, 1 989). · 
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- The ritual of saying yes18 
- The ritual of raising a hand 19 
- The ritual of dropping in the ballot at elections20 
- The ritual of holding one's mouth21 
- The ritual of "going along"22 
In what seems both a statement of personal conviction and counseling to his congregation, 
he then made a statement which surely found its way into his file at Stasi headquarters: "If 
this Jesus of Nazareth means something to me, then such rituals are for me no longer 
binding." 
His words declared the status quo invalid, the reforms to date insufficient. His sermon 
was an attempt to translate the lessons of the gospel into political action in his particular 
context. And this sermon suggests that political motivation of church membership sprang 
from the pulpit. 
I encountered many other such texts of sermons during my travels. In fact, politically­
oriented sermons were still the order of the day in the Spring of 1990, months after the 
"Peaceful Revolution" had taken place. While in Dresden in March, I listened to one pastor's 
commentary on the political situation of the day. He began his sermon by saying 
We want to live. 
We want to live well. 
We want to live well soon. 
Thus, he characterized the mood of the East German people in a time when reunification · 
with the Federal Republic of; Germany (West Germany) looked imminent.23 It was a time 
in which East Germans, wearisome of years of Communist failures, looked with envy to the 
prosperity of their westward neighbor. They eagerly wanted to share in the good life, a more 
comfortable existence denied them by an ideology which forty years had proven bankrupt. 
They were jealous. At least many were, and this was the mood which drew Pastor Peter 
Meis' fire during the Sunday morning Gottesdienst. 
18"das Ja-sage-Ritual." 
19"das Hand-hebe-Ritual," as in raising one's hand to participate. 
20"das Zettel-reinwerf-Ritual bei der Wahl". The practice of casting unmarked ballots, 
thus endorsing all communist-party candidates, is discussed in section (2]. 
21"das Mund-halte-Ritual." 
22"das Mit/auf-Ritual." 
23The first national elections had recently taken place, in which the Volkskammer 
(Parliament) had been democratically chosen for the first time in GDR history. The election 
outcomes overwhelmingly supported those parties who advocated reunification. 
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His three statements, listed above, marked the progression of attitudes among the people. 
Af first, before the revolution, citizens had been concerned with freedom and justice, with 
basic issues confronting their country and their lives. In a world where "Big Brother" 
watched over everyone's shoulder, daily existence could seem like a fight for survival. They 
just wanted to live. But as the prospects for a changed political structure brightened, East 
Germans began to peer around the iron curtain to glimpse the fabulous lifestyles of the West. 
If things were to change, why could they not take a few pointers from Western neighbors? 
The West must have been doing something right. It would never be enough to simply escape 
the daily hardship of bygone years. For many, nothing short of a life like the West would 
do. They wanted to live well. And of course, once it became apparent that reunification was 
simply a matter of time, time became very precious. The sooner the better. 
These were the premises of the sermon I heard that March morning. Pastor Meis was 
preaching from a familiar text: "You shall have no other god before me." He was attempting 
to warn the congregation of the Redeemer-St. Andrew's Church24, where he was a guest 
preacher that Sunday, not to fall prey to the "new religion" of the market economy. They 
should not worship the West German Deutschmark as their new god. As he said, "We know 
that this new way can bring good and more freedom, but we know that it is not without risk." 
He expressed a skepticism about the new economic system being imported into East 
Germany, and his sermon cautioned church-goers that everything was not necessarily green 
on the other side of the hill. 25 
Though the subs.tance of sermons had changed since prior to the revolution, one thing 
remained clear: They continued to be political in nature. Pastor Albani had spoken of 
resistance to the established order, of laying aside the "rituals" imposed upon them by the 
party. Meis was no longer interested in political reformation, although his sermons in the 
Fall certainly had registered that interest.26 Meis, however, was indeed interested in 
encouraging congregations not to quit their critical examination of the political, social, and 
economic orders in which they live. Thus, though the church's original goals had been met­
--the removal of central power from the party adiD:inistration--they had not yet reached and 
24This congregation was farmed some years prior by the union of two smaller 
congregations which were having difficulty supporting themselves independently. Thus the 
Redeemer Church and St. Andrew's joined to form the Redeemer-St.Andrew's (ErlOser-
Andreas) congregation. 
· 
250ne shouldn't assume, however, that Pastor Meis's sentiments were necessarily 
representative of all churches, either at that time or in that region: I spent the afternoon with 
Pastor Meis and his family. His wife, having attended their home congregation, reported that 
the visiting pastor had spoken only of how thankful East Germans should be for the financial 
support coming from the West. 
26See Peter Meis, "Gottes Reich in der DDR," in Riiumt die Steine Hinweg, pp. 90-95. 
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would not reach a day when they wo:uld not have to .-eact as Christians to their environment. 
This was the message of all the political sermOJla: East German Christians had to translate 
their faith into appropriate responses · within their socialist nation. The sermons 
communicated this point lo.ng before internal pressure erupted into political revolution. 
Perhaps some of these very sermons were responsible fo� .motivating many Christi�ns to 
political activism. As demonstr�ted by their ·occurr�nce long after the revolution, however, 
these sermons were far more than an isolated ecclesiastical effort to cha�ge the particular 
problem of SED politics. Instead, they testify to the commitment of East German churches 
to be relevant to their context. The sermons are �n expression of a self-understanding which 
equates to this commitment. 
[5) The Condliary Process 
The "Conciliary Process" is a name which was given to an ecumenical movement among 
churches in the German· Democratic Republic. Like its American counterpart, 27 it was a 
cooperative effort involving Christian communities of differing denominations, differing 
traditions and differing confessions. Much of the impetus behind these ecumenical efforts 
seems to have originat�d in West Germany,28 where it was championed by well-known 
scientist Carl Friedrich von Weizacker.29 The East German Conciliary . Process, however, 
owed its success to something which other, similar efforts in different countries lacked - -· 
. 
. 
that is, the involvement of nearly every large Christian group, notably the Roman Catholic 
Church, which has been reluctant to participate in most crusades of this sort. 
The churches involved in the "council" were able to work together because they proceeded 
by asking themselves, "On what exactly can we agree?" In the contemporary world, they 
agreed, the most pressing problems are issues which lend themselves to three categories. 
There are questions concerning justice and human rights, questions concerning peace, and 
questions concerning the environment or the preservation of creation. Thus, the various 
churches laid their differences aside in order to deal only with those concerris which . 
commanded the attention of each. 
In East Germany, the churches found themselves in a context which, as stated earlier, 
demanded their active response as a Christian community. Therefore, these groups came 
27The American analog to this ecumenical movement is sometimes known by its call for 
"Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation" (JPIC). Of course, I do not mean to suggest 
that the American movement has had analogous political goals or influence in the United 
States. 
281 say only seems to have originated because, of course, other such movements can be 
found in many countries. I found, however, many ties to West Germany in particular. 
29Carl Friedrich is the brother of Bundesprasident Richard von Weizacker'. 
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together to discuss questions mentioned above as they applied specifically to East Germany. 
In February of 1 988, 1 50 delegates from nineteen church communities met for the first full 
ecumenical assembly in Dresden. Those church organizations taking part were:30 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Christlicher Kirchen (Evangelical/Lutheran) 
Evangelische Landeskirche Anhalts 
Evangelische Kirche Berlin-Brandenburg 
Evangelische Kirche des Gorlitzer Kirchengebiets 
Evangelische Landeskirche Greifswald 
Evangelische- Lutherische Landeskirche Mecklenburgs 
Evangelische Kirche der Kirche Provinz Sachsens 
Evangelische-Lutherische Landeskirche Sachsens 
Evangelische Briiderfinittit (United Brethren) 
Evangelisch-methodistische Kirche (Methodist) 
Bund Evangelisch-Freikirchlicher Gemeinden (Evangelical/Free Church) 
Kirchenbund evangelisch -ref ormierter Gemeinden (Evangelical/Reformed) 
Gemeindeverband der Altkatholischen Kirche (Ancient Catholic) 
Mennonitengemeinde (Mennonite) · 
Romisch-Katholische Kirche (Roman-Catholic) · 
Mitteleuropaisches Exarchart der Russichen Orthodox en Kirchen (Russian Orthodox) 
Gemeinschaft der Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten (Seventh-Day-Adventists) 
Religiose Gesellschaft der Freunde (Quakers) 
Apostelamt Jesu Christi (Apostolate of Jesus Christ) 
Again in October, this group met in Magdeburg, and finally, in April, 1 989, delegates 
converged on Dresden for a third full assembly. These meetings proved to be of significant 
impact for the future of East Germany, due to the fact that many of the answers and 
innovations suggested. by the churches found much influence in later politics. 
In effect, the results of the three assemblies were a response to the question, "What do 
we, as the church, want for the political, social, and economic situation in which we find 
ourselves?" The meetings sought to explicitly state a platform which would confront the 
pressing issues of justice, peace, and environment. The results of the assemblies are 
contained in the form of resolutions published collectively after the conclusion of the third 
assembly. The following is an attempt to briefly outline much of that platform:81 
The document begins with several introductions--to the general reader, to the 
congregations, and to children. It then proceeds to lament the problems of East German 
society, which in many cases sound strikingly similar to our own. It condemns as unjust the 
forced "voluntary participation" in socialist and communist organizations, by which citizens 
30This list is published in the documentation published after the third full assembly, 
which is discussed later. Okumenische Versammlung filr Gerechtigkeit. Frieden und Bewahrung 
der Schoofung. Dresden-:..Magdeburg--Dresden. Eine Dokumentation. (Berlin: Aktion 
Siihnezeichen/Friedensdienste, 1 990), p. 1 82. 
31The text bears simply the tile "Okumenische Versammlung fUr Gerechtigkeit. Frieden und 
Bewahrung der Schopfung," that is, "Ecumenical Assembly for Justice, Peace and the 
Preservation of Creation." 
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have proven their loyalty to the state. P.-imarily children had been the victims of such 
pressure, being compelled to take part in the FDJ32 and activities of defense education. 33 
Denouncing the many methods by �hich citizens were coerced not to "rock the boat," the text 
states "One says what others want to hear, and has gotten used to saying something other than 
he thinks, and to acting differently than what corresponds to his convictions."34 The society 
provided no support for "outcast" groups such as alcoholics, the handicapped, and 
homosexuals. Youth were discouraged from expressing themselves, and their alternative 
modes of thinking, dressing, and talking were viewed by the state as criminal. Though 
provided by law, women had yet to achieve equal rights. The family was in crisis; fathers 
were never home due to industry demands. Children were forced to stay in inadequate day­
care from a very young age because both parents had to work. Divorce rates were high, and 
there was simply insufficient care for the elderly. Certainly, these were problems in need 
of addressing. And yet, there were still greater, globally-oriented problems to be tackled.36 
In the military arena, the churches called for quite specific changes. The polarization of 
the peace organizations led by the Soviet Union and the United States (Warsaw Pact, NATO) 
was to be dissolved by massive restructuring with the goal of reducing first-strike capabilities 
and threats for all parties. This was to be prosecuted through calculated measures to reduce 
conventional offensive capacities in the Central European corridor. This reduction was to 
be accompanied by token acts signifying the political will to disarm: Nations were to increase 
the exchange of sensitive d�ta;36 there was to be a step-by-step broadening of mutual 
observation activities (unrestricted fly-overs, etc.), and limitations were to be set on large­
scale maneuvers and tactical exercises. In Central Europe, a zone was to be constructed 
which was free of all nuclear and conventional first-strike capabilities. Likewise, as a step 
32The communist youth organization. 
33After the signing of SALT II in 1 978, the East German administration perceived a 
greater military threat from the western Allies. Therefore it implemented a program of 
defense education (Wehrunterricht), whereby school children learned basic wartime skills. 
Boys were taught more skills necessary for becoming soldiers, girls were taught more civil 
defense skills. University students were trained as the elite, with the intention that they 
would be reserve officers until times of war. 
340p. cit., p. 76. 
350p. cit., pp. 74f. 
36Presumably this was in keeping with the spirit of President Reagan's willingness to give 
Star Wars capabilities to the Soviets once developed. 
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towJ!d their eventual world-wide elimination, all chemical weapons were to be removed from 
Central Europe. A ban on all nuclear weapons testins was to be declared. 37 
The document calls for the construction of a Pan-European peace organization which 
would work in cooperation with the United Nations. It calls for a general troop realignment 
in Europe, so that imminent attack is perceived as less likely. Likewise, efforts must be 
made to insure pan-European recognition of the individual sovereignty of all European states. 
Cooperative research efforts were called for which would serve to build trust between 
nations, and channels were to be opened and broadened between citizens' groups from all 
European nations. 
The Conciliary Process produced a great deal of political influence in the earliest days 
of the post-revolutionary East Germany. Many pertinent issues had already been discussed 
by the church, and thus the groundwork had been laid for progress towards East German 
democracy. In fact, several fledgling parties referred to the documents from the ecumenical 
assemblies as they built political platforms. Wolfgang Ullman, founder and leader of the 
opposition party "Democracy Now," testified in an interview with me that those very 
documents had played an important role in the writing of his party's original platform. 
Other parties as well, such as the better known New Forum, were most certainly influenced 
by the careful work of the Conciliary Process. 
[61 The Round Table Discussions 
In the months fotiowing the dissolution of Communist Party control of the East German 
government, the church hosted the "round table discussions," which attempted to bring 
representatives from every political party together for dialogue. In the transitional stages 
from party-run government to the practical establis�ment of democratic " government, it was 
the round table mechanism which led the political discussion and played a mediating role 
between new parties on key issues. Round tables existed on the local, regional, and national 
levels. Not until after the community elections of May, 1990 did official organs exist which 
could replace the round tables. 
Pastors typically acted as the moderators for round �able discussions, for no other 
institution occupied a position of trust as did the church. And whereas the church did 
exercise some degree of influence on the process of democratization by acting as host, it 
should be pointed out that the role of �oderator alsc:> prevented the church from contributing 
much of a substantial nature to the actual dialogue. One pastor commented, "Because the 
moderator must take care tha� everyone has an opportunity to .speak, and because [as 
moderator] he must keep his own position to himself, we justifiably have the impression that 
370o. cit., pp. 92f. 
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the church's social and political suggestions,· tmat is� substantial suggestions, are not being 
heard." 
Some moderators did create for themselves the opportunity to serve in future political 
positions. Most, however, expressed to me their desire to return to the . business they know 
best. As one East Berlin pastor, who had served as moderator for a community round table, 
told me, "I'm no politician. I want to be a pastor again;" 
The role of the round tables should not be underestimated. These opportunities for 
dialogue helped to create a mood of cooperation among otherwise divided parties, and they 
helped maintain a political order amidst the power vacuum created by the communist demise. 
Their effectiveness was somewhat limited, of course, by the fact that they had no power to 
enact their decisions. Still, the results of dialogue among parties most assuredly included 
future cooperation, more effective representation by opposition party members, and a sense 
of direction for a people whose confidence and hope for government were short in supply 
at the time. 
Conclusion 
These are but a few of the many more numerous and documented roles which the 
protestant churches of East Germany played prior to and during the "Peaceful Revolution" 
of 1 989. It is most important to realize that it was the church which acted as representative 
for the East German people and dialogue partner to the Communist Party. It was the church 
which at last mobilized the people to peaceful action. · Whether by support of non-christian 
opposition groups, explicitly political activity, work for nonviolence, timely and germane 
sermons, creation of political platforms through ecumenical ·assemblies, or encouragement of 
discussion and cooperation among political parties at the round tables, the Protestant church 
demonstrated its resolve to be "in the middle" of East.German society and therefore relevant 
to the needs of its people. 
The next years will see the church develop the position it has created for itself. It is now 
perhaps more trusted than at any time in several centuries. Popular regard for the church 
is now largely positive, and the church possesses the opportunity to speak with a remarkably 
louder voice than in several decades. If it is to maintain that position, however, it must do 
more than view the present as a chance for evangelism. One Berlin pastor put it, " We can't 
just say, 'Now we'll be pious again.' " The church cannot afford to change its character as 
a forum for thought and political or social innovation. It must continue its role as public 
educator and must endeavor to continue its role as a dialogue partner to the government on 
behalf of the people. Perhaps most importantly, said the same Berlin'pastor, the church must 
not stop being "the speaker for the weak." "After all," he said, "that's what we've always 
been." 
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